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extended to other cases? When a fortune-teller is arrested for false pretenses or a faithhealer for illegal practice of medicine, shall a jury be allowed to determine whether his
claim that he is a Spiritualist or a Scientist is made in good faith? If a bequest is conditioned on the beneficiary's "accepting Christ," can a court inquire into the sincerity of
his conversion?
Mr. Rubenstein and Mr. Torpey have done the back-breaking job of collecting a mass
of case and statutory material, and have put it in an organized form. They have made
clear the breadth and complexity of the problem. From this raw material and preliminary work, it is earnestly hoped that they or others building upon what they have done
will spell out the broader principles upon which the cases are based and give additional
light on some of these difficult problems.
CLYDE W. SUMMERS.
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What emerges from this volume, and is repeated on almost every page, is the authors'
firm conviction that "the fundamental principle of separation of Church and State" is a
good thing. Most Americans are inclined to give an unthinking assent. The real trouble
comes when we'try to find out just those words mean. At that point we soon discover, as
Alice remarked to Humpty Dumpty, that "the question is whether you can make words
mean so many different things." The process of making the same word mean too many
different things is going on in all sections of the world under our eyes today. In Soviet
Russia, where (unlike the United States) the words "separation of Church and State"
appear in the constitution, those words, like "democracy," mean something quite different
from what they mean to us or to the authors of this book. Even in our own country,
we appear to be witnessing a considerable shift of meaning in certain quarters, with the
result that "the principle of separation of Church and State" is today being invoked
in a way which would make the Founding Fathers turn over in their graves.
To say that a given practice is or is not consistent with "the principle of separation of
Church and State" is apt to be misleading unless we knew just what that "principle" is.
A careful study of the material painstakingly collected by the authors, and covering such
diverse subjects as Bible reading in the public schools, the right of pacifists to be naturalized, and the propriety of laws which forbid barbers to work on Sunday, leaves us with
the uncomfortable feeling that the "principle" may not be a principle after all, but only
a rather dangerous catchword. If the authors have been unable to dispel existing confusion
on this score, the fault is not theirs alone, but is to be shared with a good many judges,
who, like other human beings, are not above the temptation of labeling catchwords as
"principles" in order to cover up gaps in logic. The real difficulty in drawing the line
of separation between church and state arises from the fact that man is composed of a
mortal body and an immortal soul; and you cannot draw a clearly visible line between
his body and soul except with the executioner's axe or its equivalent-in which case he
ceases to be a complete man. So long as the two parts of him stay together, he will continue to have two allegiances; and those two allegiances will sometimes conflict.
It is out of such conflicts that most of the litigation tabulated in this book has arisen.
By far the greater part of that litigation has involved the field of education. As the
authors quite rightly point out, education in this country was from the start primarily
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a religious matter. It was only by slow degrees and within comparatively recent times
that the state got into the business. A real problem of our times is just how far the
process is going to go. Pierce v. Society of Sisters1 established in striking words that
"the child is not the mere creature of the State,' 2 that the state had no right to a monopoly
of education, and that parents are entitled to the decisive word in the matter. That decision,
as the authors recognize, stands as a bulwark against totalitarianism in this country.
It is precisely on this question of the right of parents against the claims of the
omnipotent secular state that a good many people have been alarmed-I hope undulyby some of the implications which they have seen in the language of recent Supreme
Court decisions. When the Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education,3 said that
neither a state nor the Federal Government "can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another," 4 and when the same Court in McCollum
v. Board of Education,5 criticized released-time religious instruction on the ground that
"pupils compelled by law to go to school for secular education are released in part from
their legal duty,"6 the specter of a godless state telling all parents how they should educate
their children seemed closer to American homes than is altogether comfortable.
The authors of this book give only the briefest mention to the McCollum caseperhaps because the decision was handed down too late for fuller discussion. At any rate,
they quote from only one of the four opinions handed down in that case, and do not even
mention the other three. If, as Justice Jackson in that case feared, the Supreme Court
has become a "super board of education for every school district in the nation," we can
at least expect clarification at the highest level.
The Founding Fathers, after all, recognized the right order of values when they said
in the Northwest Ordinance:
Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and
the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever
be encouraged.8
Unless we are to go the way of the totalitarian countries, the state can never become
completely godless nor divorce itself from morality-or, more specifically, from Christian
morality.
After all, as the Supreme Court said in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,9
we are (or at least until recently were) a Christian country. Justice Story, who was
closer than we are to the time of the Founding Fathers, said in his Commentaries that
at the time the Constitution was adopted
An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to
hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation if
not universal indignation.1 °
Indeed, if the catch-phrase "separation of Church and State" is to be applied as a principle in all cases, future editions of Messrs. Johnson and Yost's book may require a good
many additional chapters. If the state is to stop aiding any or all religions, it will have
to stop a good many practices not mentioned in the present edition. Tax exemptionjon
church properties had better be stopped at once; but that is only the beginning. What
right, for example, has the godless state to employ and pay the clergy to minister as
chaplains to the spiritual needs of convicts, members of the armed forces, and Congress268 U. S. 510 (1925).
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men? What right has it to waste the money of atheist taxpayers in building chapels
on military reservations? If, on the theory of holding all religions equal, there is no
difference in the eyes of the state between Christian and Mohammedan morality, why
should I go to jail if I insist on having four wives at the same time?
The plain fact, whether we like it or not, is that American political institutions and
American ideas of morality have developed out of the background of western Christianity,
and are founded on it. So long as those institutions and that idea of morality continue,
state and church will live together on friendly terms and can never be completely separated.
The state will continue to inculcate and uphold those moral ideas; and the church will
continue to inculcate and uphold good American citizenship. Conflicts of course are
bound to arise; but it is a credit to the good sense of the American people that most of
such conflicts until now have been around the fringes and over relatively minor matters.
In the main, they have been settled, and I hope in the future will,be settled, on a basis
of mutual give-and-take and commonsense recognition of the rights of both sides.
The real and serious conflict comes--and I hope that in this country it will never
come-when the forces of complete and total secularism get control of the state. Right
here we have a real danger in the uncritical acceptance of cliche's and catchwords as a
substitute for careful thinking. It was Huey Long who said that if fascism ever established itself in the United States it would probably be under the label of "anti-fascism."
In somewhat the same way, if secular totalitarianism ever establishes itself here, it will
probably be under the label of "freedom of religion" and "separation of Church and State."
That is something against which we must all be on guard. I wonder whether the
authors--or the readers-of this book are sufficiently aware of the danger.
There are a number of errors in the book-some merely typographical and others
of more importance-which call for correction. A good many of them betray what
appears to be the non-legal background of the authors. Permoli v. First Municipality,"
appears at page 12 as "Permodi v. Municipality" and at page 37 as "Permoli v. Orleans,"
2
and is indexed under both titles. The Oregon school case, Pierce v.Society of Sisters,'
hardly belongs on page 38 in the chapter entitled "Bible Reading in the Public Schools."
A petition for mandamus is not brought "by the people in relation to" the relator;' 3
nor does a state legislature pass an "action."' 4 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was
not called upon in the case cited at -page 144 to interpret or apply "the school code of
New York." "Chief Justice Cardoza" (sic) appears at page 78 and "Chief Justice Holmes"
at page 183. Mrs. McCollum's famous action was brought in the Circuit Court of Champaign County, Illinois, and not in the Supreme Court of the stateY It is hardly accurate
to say that nuns wear "clerical garb,"' 16 or that the wearing of such garb constitutes "the
flaunting of a unique act of religion."'1 The facts set forth in an opinion are not "the facts
of the court."' 8 A lawyer who tried to carry his case "through the New York court
of appeals to the state supreme court"19 would find himself involved in pretty serious
jurisdictional difficulties. Donahoe v.Richards,20 which dealt with Bible reading in the
public schools and is cited on that subject at page 36, is cited again at page 146, apparently
for the proposition that a state cannot support parochial schools. Constitutional lawyers
would be more than mildly surprised to learn 2' that Meyer v.Nebraska,22 "is one of the
comparatively small number of cases" in which state statutes have been thrown out under
the Fourteenth Amendment. It is somewhat puzzling to be told 23 that Cochran v.
"2 See note i stupra.
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Louisiana State Board of Education, which unanimously held that a state can appropriate money to farnish text books to pupils in private as well as in public schools, "concedes
greater rights to the state" than Meyer v. Nebraska, and Pierce v.Society of Sisters.
Some of these same errors appeared in the earlier edition, published in 1934 under
the title of The Legal Status of Church-StateRelationships in the United States. .We could
wish that the earlier title-which avoids confusion between catchwords and principleshad been retained.
PORTER R. CHANDLER.
Member of the New York Bar.
FREE SPEEcH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT.
York: Harper Bros., 1948. Pp. xiv, 107. $2.00.
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Whenever an intelligent layman discusses the law, the result is often like that of the
child in the fairy tale who sees that the emperor has been wearing no clothes. This
book gives such a fresh outlook and revaluation to material often taken for granted.
Professor Meildejohn starts with the concept that the Bill of Rights is an integral part
of self-government and that the First Amendment means what it says. He therefore takes
the position that Congress may not enact any law which abridges freedom of speech.
Nevertheless he concedes that under certain circumstances speech can be prohibited. He
attempts to resolve this apparent paradox by distinguishing between "public" and "private"
speech, a distinction which, however, he does not adequately develop.
Thus Professor Meiklejohn insists that no policy may be denied a hearing and no
persons barred because "their views are thought to be false or dangerous. No plan of
action shall be outlawed because someone in control thinks it unwise, unfair, un-American... ." It is this mutilation of the thinking process against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed. On the other hand, he points out that liberty of
speech may be curtailed, provided the procedures are proper, under the Fifth Amendment
when the speech is private, like that of a merchant advertising his wares or a paid lobbyist.
These simple instances, however, do not exhaust the category of private speech which
the author believes can, under some circumstances, be prohibited. Professor Meiklejohn
does not, for instance, meet the issue of whether the advocacy of the overthrow of the
government by force may be punished; for he says only:
Third, the theory fails to recognize that, under the Constitution, the freedom of
advocacy or incitement to action by the government may never be abridged. It is
only advocacy or incitement to action by individuals or nonpolitical groups which
is open to regulation.2
Professor Meiklejohn's main thesis is that the courts have ignored the distinction he
believes to be essential and reduced the area of freedom. He particularly criticizes Justice
Holmes' formulation of the "clear and present danger" rule, saying:
Mr. Holmes and the Supreme Court have ventured to annul the First Amendment
because they have believed that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
could take its place 3
Professor Meiklejohn rejects the Holmes distinction between speech as action and
2L281 U. S. 370 (1930).
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